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ABSTRACT
Finding optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auc-
tions is a hard problem and finding approximations to the
optimal solution is also hard. We investigate the use of
Branch-and-Bound techniques: they require both a way to
bound from above the value of the best allocation and a good
criterion to decide which bids are to be tried first. Different
methods for efficiently bounding from above the value of the
best allocation are considered. Theoretical original results
characterize the best approximation ratio and the ordering
criterion that provides it. We suggest to use this criterion.
Keywords
Combinatorial Auctions, Branch and Bound
1. MULTI-UNIT COMBINATORIAL AUC-
TIONS (MUCAS)
Auctions have been used from times immemorial, but the
renewed modern interest in auctions stems from:
• their increased use for selling off government property
after WWII and later in extensive denationalizations,
and
• the theoretical breakthroughs started by [14].
A very recent surge of interest in auctions stems from their
surprising success on the internet. Many foresee internet
auctions in which:
• the number of buyers will be large
• the number of items for sale will be large
• the mechanism used to determine the allocation and
the payment will be complex both from the game-
theoretic strategic and from the computational points
of view.
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This work deals with computational aspects of winner de-
termination in multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Combina-
torial auctions are mechanisms in which a number of items
are up for sale and bidders bid for subsets of those items. In
combinatorial auctions one typically assumes that all items
for sale are different. Computational aspects of combinato-
rial auctions have been considered in [10, 11, 1, 6, 8, 12].
Multi-unit combinatorial auctions are those combinatorial
auctions in which certain of the items for sale are identical.
We assume n different commodities and kj identical items
of commodity j for j = 1, . . . n. The problem we are trying
to solve is that of determining the optimal allocation of the
items. A set of bids is given: each bid requests a number of
units (possibly zero) from each commodity and offers a price
p for the whole set. A subset of the set of all bids is conflict-
free if, for each commodity, the sum of the units requested
does not surpass the number of units for sale. The problem
is to find a conflict-free subset that maximizes the sum of
the prices proposed. Multi-unit combinatorial auctions have
been considered in [7].
2. BRANCH-AND-BOUND SEARCH
The problem of finding the optimal solution of a multi-
unit combinatorial auction is a hard problem, i.e., requires
extensive resources, as will be shown formally in Section 5.
It is therefore essential that one designs carefully the algo-
rithm and uses the available resources smartly. The method
we propose to use is based on the branch-and-bound search
technique developed by operations researchers [5]. The use
of some branch-and-bound techniques for finding optimal so-
lutions for combinatorial auctions has been considered in [1]
and more thoroughly in [8]. The case of multi-unit com-
binatorial auctions is considered in [7] where a wealth of
heuristics are proposed. This paper concentrates on the fun-
damentals and characterizes the best ordering heuristics.
The general description of the branch-and-bound tech-
nique below is well-known. The resource in shortest sup-
ply is space (i.e. memory) and therefore we propose to use
a depth-first search, with backtracking to cover the whole
search space. At any time we essentially keep in memory
only a partial solution, i.e., a set of non-conflicting bids. We
look for a bid that can be added to the partial solution with-
out creating a conflict and if there is none, know we have
attained a possible solution and backtrack. The additional
information of which we need to keep track consists only of
the best solution found so far and backtracking information.
On the whole the space requirements are linear in the size
of the problem. Note that, at any time, we have allocated
part of the items and are left with a smaller problem of the
same type: finding the optimal solution of another, smaller,
MUCA.
An exhaustive search such as sketched above will require
exponential time for all possible inputs. One may hope to
find an algorithm that will run faster on the easy inputs.
Even though the theoretical considerations of Section 5 seem
to preclude that there be a majority of easy cases, one may
hope that many of the problems that will have to be solved
in practice will turn out to be easy. We are hoping for an
algorithm that will run fast on those easy problems. The
powerful branch-and-bound idea is that, in many situations,
we may be able to conclude on the spot that adding a spe-
cific bid to our partial solution is hopeless and that we can
immediately backtrack, saving us the exploration of a whole
sub-tree, i.e., enabling us to prune a whole sub-tree. All we
need for that is a good upper-bound for the value of the
optimal solution of the smaller MUCA concerning the items
still unallocated. If we have such an upper bound and if
the sum of this upper bound and the values of the bids of
our partial solution is not larger than the value of the best
solution found so far, we may backtrack immediately: no ex-
tension of our partial solution may have a value larger than
that of the solution we already know. In Section 3, we shall
propose a number of ways to bound from above the value
that can be obtained from auctioning the still unallocated
goods. There is obviously no need to commit to a single
method: one may use many such methods, obtain a number
of different upper bounds and use the smallest of all.
The pruning described above is most effective if the best
solution found so far, that is used to decide whether to prune
or not, is in fact a good solution. If we find the optimal (or
a very good) solution early on, even though we shall not
know that it is the optimal solution (or how good it is),
we shall be able to prune more sub-trees than if we had
a best solution so far that is not as good. It is therefore
essential that we find the best solutions early on. We should,
therefore, carefully choose the order in which we try to enter
the bids into partial solutions and try the most promising
bids first. To summarize, we need a good heuristic to pick
the most promising bid in a set of bids, and this is the third
component of branch-and-bound method. We shall use such
a heuristic to find the most promising bid in the smaller
MUCA concerning the items still unallocated iteratively to
find the most promising of those bids that does not conflict
with the partial solution at hand. We shall then use the
upper-bound described above to decide whether to prune
the whole sub-tree or not. Notice that we do not propose to
rank the bids once and for all: the most promising bid may
depend on the partial solution at hand. For example, the
normalized criteria described below in Equations 5 and 7
imply such a dependency. In [7] the heuristic proposed to
choose the next bid takes into account the whole set of bids.
We restrict our attention to heuristics that consider each bid
separately. In Section 4 we shall consider different criteria
for this task and in Section 5 we shall characterize the best
one. It turns out that this optimal criterion does not depend
on the partial allocation, or, equivalently, on the set of items
still unallocated, and therefore one can simply order the bids
according to this criterion once and for all at the start of the
algorithm.
In this paper, we shall assume that any subset of bids such
that, for any commodity, the sum of the units requested does
not exceed the total number of units available is a legal so-
lution. We shall not consider explicitly the case in which
certain bids are exclusive, i.e., no legal solution can contain
certain pairs of bids. The generalization of our (and essen-
tially any) branch and bound algorithm to the case of pos-
sibly exclusive bids is quite straightforward, though: when
considering whether to add a specific bid to a partial allo-
cation, check not only whether there are enough units left
to satisfy it and whether the sub-tree can be pruned, check
also whether the bid considered is not excluded by some bid
of the partial solution.
3. BOUNDING FROM ABOVE
We noticed that, at any point, we have a partial allocation,
i.e. a set of non-conflicting bids, and are trying to extend it.
The best possible extension is, again, the optimal solution to
the MUCA of the remaining units to the remaining bids. We
shall therefore look for ways to bound from above the value
of any MUCA. We also noticed that one may use a number
of different methods, obtain numerous upper-bounds, and
take the smallest one. We propose three different types of
methods.
3.1 Linear Programming
The first method we propose is Linear Programming. Our
problem is an integer-programming problem: find xi ∈ {0, 1}
for each bid i that maximizes
∑
i xi p(i) while satisfying the
linear constraints:
∑
i xi q(i, j) ≤ kj . The variable xi indi-
cates whether bid i is in the optimal solution (xi = 1) or
out of it (xi = 0). The relaxed linear programming problem
in which we allow xi ∈ [0, 1] will provide a value
∑
i xi p(i)
that is an upper-bound for the value of the optimal solution
to the original MUCA. Notice that the solution of the relax-
ation allows for fractional allocation of bids: xi = 1/2 may
be interpreted as allocating half of the quantities requested
by i at half the price proposed. In the worst case, for theo-
retical reasons, it seems that the upper bound provided by
LP cannot be good, but there are reasons to think that in
practice, and especially for large kj ’s the bound could be
pretty good quite often. An extended discussion of the re-
lation between the solutions to the original and the relaxed
problems may be found in [8].
Notice also that, if the optimal solution to the relaxed
problem is integral, then we know it is the optimal solution
to the original problem. The integrality of the solution to
the LP problem is the signal for backtracking.
3.2 Projections
Another, quite different, idea is to consider only one com-
modity. By projecting bid i on commodity j, to i′ = 〈0, . . . ,
q(i, j), . . . , 0, p(i)〉, we transform our original MUCA into
a knapsack problem. The optimal solution to the knap-
sack problem is obviously an upper bound for the opti-
mal solution of the original MUCA. The knapsack being
polynomially-approximable at any precision, one may easily
obtain an upper bound in this way, in fact n such upper
bounds, one for each commodity.
3.3 Average price consideration
The bounds described above are not difficult to compute
and quite different in spirit (and probably results). Our
next bound is related to the Linear Programming one of
Section 3.1: it always provide an upper bound that is larger
than or equal to the one provided by LP, but it is extremely
easy to compute. Consider the average price per unit for
bid i: a(i) = p(i) /
∑n
j=1 q(i, j). Suppose a is the largest of
the a(i)’s. Then clearly the value of the optimal solution
to the MUCA is bounded from above by a
∑n
j=1 kj . The
value of the optimal solution to the relaxed LP problem is
also bounded by this quantity.
4. CHOOSING THE MOST PROMISING BID
Given positive integers k1, . . . , kn, how should one com-
pare the attractiveness, at first sight, of two bids a = 〈q1, q2, . . . ,
qn, p〉 and a′ = 〈q′1, q′2, . . . , q′n, p′〉? We may as well say we
are looking for a criterion r, i.e. a real-valued function of
the bid a, possibly depending on the parameters kj ’s such
that r(a) ≥ r(a′) iff a is more promising than a′.
Some obvious considerations may be made immediately.
The corresponding heuristics have been incorporated in [7].
If the quantities qj and q
′
j are equal, but p is larger than
p′, one should obviously prefer a to a′ and in fact, since
the two bids conflict, one can remove a′ from consideration.
Similarly, if the prices p and p′ are equal and qj ≤ q′j for
every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then one should prefer a to a′ and remove
a′ from consideration. In other terms, the function r should
be monotonic in p and anti-monotonic in the qj ’s. Notice
that any such function will have the effect of removing from
consideration all the dominated bids as above.
Many functions come to mind. The simplest one is prob-
ably:
r(a) = p , (1)
i.e., order the bids by the price they propose. The most
natural function that comes to mind is probably:
r(a) =
p∑n
j=1 qj
, (2)
that orders the bids by average price per unit. But one may
prefer to normalize the elements of the sum by the number
of units of each commodity that are available and use:
r(a) =
p∑n
j=1 qj/kj
. (3)
If one has a geometrical bind one may prefer the Euclidean:
r(a) =
p√∑n
j=1 q
2
j
, (4)
or the normalized:
r(a) =
p√∑n
j=1(qj/kj)
2
. (5)
A previous result on combinatorial auctions [6] suggests the
consideration of:
r(a) =
p√∑n
j=1 qj
, (6)
or of:
r(a) =
p√∑n
j=1 qj/kj
. (7)
Many other criteria could be considered, of the form:
r(a) =
p
(
∑n
j=1 q
l
j)
m
or
r(a) =
p
(
∑n
j=1(qj/kj)
l)m
It is extremely difficult to guess what is the best criterion to
use in a branch-and-bound algorithm. Experimental results
would be interesting and we are in the process of obtaining
such results but the lack of real-life data casts a doubt on
the applicability of the conclusions that can be drawn from
synthesized data.
Based on each of those criteria, one can devise a (differ-
ent) greedy algorithm to find a solution to MUCAs: pick
the most promising bid in the partial solution, then find the
most promising remaining bid that does not conflict with the
partial solution, and so on until no bid can be added. We are
looking for the criterion that gives the best greedy algorithm.
In what sense? We choose to compare greedy algorithms by
the approximation ratio they provide in the worst-case. A
greedy algorithm that provides, on any MUCA, a solution
that is at least one-tenth of the optimal solution will be pre-
ferred to any algorithm that provides only one-hundredth of
the optimal solution on some MUCA. Notice that we could
assume a probability distribution on the inputs and com-
pare the expected values of the solutions found (or their
ratio to the optimal one), but this is not what we propose
to do. Our choice is consistent with that of the theoretical
CS community. The next section is devoted to theoretical
considerations leading to the characterization of the best
criterion.
5. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
THE WEIGHTED MULTI-SET PACKING
(WMSP) PROBLEM
The problem of finding an optimal allocation in a multi-
unit combinatorial auction is best described as a general-
ization of the weighted set packing problem [2, 13]: the
weighted multi-set packing problem. It seems the same
problem has been studied in [9].
We consider n commodities and assume kj units of each
of n commodities: j = 1, . . . , n are available. The kj ’s are
positive natural numbers. We shall denote by k the quantity∑n
j=1 kj . On the whole k items are to (may) be allocated.
A bid is written: 〈q1, q2, . . . , qn, p〉, where the q’s are natu-
ral numbers with qj ≤ kj and p is a natural number (or a
rational nonnegative number). A bid is an offer to acquire
qj units of each commodity j for a total sum of p. Given a
set of bids we want to find a subset that maximizes the sum
of the p’s such that for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the sum of the
qj ’s is less than or equal to kj . A number of special cases
are worth noticing:
• if all kj ’s are equal to one, the problem is the weighted
set packing (WSP) problem,
• if there is only one commodity (n = 1), the problem is
the knapsack problem.
Our first result, a trivial generalization from [11, 6], shows
that the WMSP problem is not only NP-hard but also hard
to approximate.
Theorem 1. Unless NP=ZPP1, the WMSP problem can-
not be approximated within n1/2−ǫ in polynomial time, for
any ǫ > 0.
Proof. A graph with v vertices and e edges defines a
WMSP problem in the following way. Consider e commodi-
ties (n = e) and assume kj units of commodity j are for
sale. The kj ’s are arbitrary. There are v bids. Bid i of-
fers a price of 1 for kj units of each of the commodities (i.e.
edges) j that vertex i is adjacent to. Any feasible alloca-
tion defines a set of independent vertices and its value is
the size of the independent set. The solution of the WMSP
problem is therefore equivalent to finding a maximal inde-
pendent set. An f(n)-approximation of the WMSP problem
provides an f(e)-approximation of the Maximal Indepen-
dent Set problem. By [3], no efficient k1−ǫ-approximation
exists for the maximal independent set problem, therefore
no e1/2−ǫ-approximation, unless NP=ZPP.
In [6] it is shown that theWSP problem admits a polynomial-
time n1/2-approximation and that there is a greedy algo-
rithm that achieves this (optimal) approximation ratio. No-
tice that finding a polynomial-time k−1-approximation of
the Maximal Independent Set is trivial, but finding such an
n1/2-approximation for WSP is not. In the more general
case of WMSP problems, we shall characterize the approx-
imation quality of greedy algorithms as
√
k =
√∑n
j=1 kj in
Theorems 2 and 3, but we do not know how to match the
lower bound of Theorem 1. For reasons explained above, we
are interested in solving (approximately) WMSP problems
by a greedy algorithm. For such algorithms, we may prove
a result that is stronger than Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. No (polynomial-time) greedy algorithm can
guarantee an approximation of better than
√
k.
Proof. Define a unit bid as a bid offering a sum of 1 for
a single unit of a single commodity: 〈0, 0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0, 1〉.
There are n different unit bids, but the same unit bid may
appear a number of times in the list of bids. Given a greedy
algorithm, let u be the unit bid that is ranked first among
all unit bids by the algorithm.
Two problems, i.e., sets of bids, will be described. A
greedy algorithm will perform badly, i.e. propose a solu-
tion that is only a
√
k-approximation, on one of those two
problems. In the first problem, there are only two bids:
1. a bid for all the units available: A = 〈k1, k2, . . . , kn,
√
k〉,
and
2. a bid u.
In the second situation, there are k + 1 bids:
1. a bid A for all the units available as above, and
2. for every j, j = 1, . . . , n, kj unit bids for commodity
j: 〈0, 0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0, 1〉.
1A language L belongs to ZPP if and only if there is some
constant c such that there is a probabilistic Turing machine
M that on input x runs in expected time O(| x |c) and out-
puts 1 if and only if x ∈ L
If bid A is ranked before u, then, in the second situation,
the greedy method obtains
√
k instead of the optimal k, a√
k-approximation. If bid u is ranked before bid A, then,
in the first situation the greedy method obtains 1 instead of
the optimal
√
k, again a
√
k-approximation. For any greedy
method, one of the two situations will give a solution that
is a factor of
√
k less than optimal.
The following positive result provides an upper-bound
that matches the lower bound of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. A greedy algorithm (to be described) pro-
vides a polynomial-time
√
k-approximation for the WMSP
problem.
Proof. We shall use the index i to range over the bids.
The bid i is: i = 〈q(i, 1), q(i, 2), . . . , q(i, n), p(i)〉. We define
w(i) =
√∑n
j=1 q(i, j). The algorithm we propose is greedy
allocation based on the following criterion r to rank the bids,
in descending order:
r(i) =
p(i)
w(i)
(8)
Let OP be the optimal solution, i.e., the set of bids con-
tained in the optimal solution. The value of the optimal so-
lution is α =
∑
i∈OP p(i). Let GR be the solution obtained
by the greedy allocation and β its value: β =
∑
i∈GR p(i).
We want to show that:
α ≤ β
√
k. (9)
Notice, first, that we may, without loss of generality, assume
that the sets OP and GR have no bid in common. Indeed, if
they have, one considers the problem in which the common
bids and all the units they request have been removed. The
greedy and optimal solutions of the new problem are sim-
ilar to the old ones and the inequality for the new smaller
problem implies the same for the original problem.
Let us consider β. By elementary algebraic considerations:
β =
∑
i∈GR
p(i) ≥
√ ∑
i∈GR
p(i)2 =
√ ∑
i∈GR
r(i)2 w(i)2 =
√√√√ ∑
i∈GR
r(i)2
n∑
j=1
q(i, j) =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
∑
i∈GR
r(i)2 q(i, j).
Consider α. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
α =
∑
i∈OP
r(i) w(i) ≤
√ ∑
i∈OP
r(i)2
√ ∑
i∈OP
w(i)2.
But: ∑
i∈OP
w(i)2 =
∑
i∈OP
n∑
j=1
q(i, j) =
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈OP
q(i, j).
The expression
∑
i∈OP q(i, j) represents the total number of
units of commodity j allocated in the optimal allocation OP
and is therefore bounded from above by kj , the number of
units available. We conclude that:
α ≤
√ ∑
i∈OP
r(i)2
√
k.
To prove (9), it will be enough, then, to prove that:
∑
i∈OP
r(i)2 ≤
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈GR
r(i)2 q(i, j).
Consider the optimal solution OP . By assumption, the
bids of OP did not enter the greedy solution GR. This
means that, at the time such a bid i is considered during
the execution of the greedy algorithm, it cannot be entered
in the partial allocation already built. This implies that
there is a commodity j, not enough units of which are still
unallocated to satisfy the quantity q(i, j) requested by bid
i. In other terms the sum of q(i, j) and the q(∗, j) of all the
bids of the greedy solution already considered was larger
than kj :
q(i, j) +
∑
l∈GR,r(l)≥r(i)
q(l, j) > kj .
In particular it follows that q(i, j) > 0 and therefore q(i, j) ≥ 1.
We attach to every bid i of OP such a commodity c(i). If
more than one such suitable commodity exists, we choose
one arbitrarily. Let OPj be the subset of OP that contains
those bids i for which c(i) = j. The OPj provide a partition
of OP and:
∑
i∈OP
r(i)2 =
n∑
j=1
∑
i∈OPj
r(i)2.
Let us denote by mj the size of the set OPj . We shall
conclude the proof by showing that, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n:∑
i∈OPj
r(i)2 ≤
∑
i∈GR
r(i)2 q(i, j).
Let lj be a bid of OPj whose r is maximal (among bids of
OPj) and let rj = r(lj). We know that:∑
i∈OPj
r(i)2 ≤ rj2 mj .
We want to boundmj from above. We remarked above that:
q(lj , j) +
∑
l∈GR,r(l)≥rj
q(l, j) > kj .
and that q(l, j) ≥ 1 for every l ∈ OPTj . Therefore:
kj ≥
∑
l∈OPj
q(l, j) ≥ q(lj , j) +mj − 1 >
kj −
∑
l∈GR,r(l)≥rj
q(l, j) +mj − 1
and therefore mj ≤
∑
l∈GR,r(l)≥rj
q(l, j). Clearly, then:
rj
2 mj ≤ rj2
∑
l∈GR,r(l)≥rj
q(l, j) ≤
∑
l∈GR,r(l)≥rj
r(l)2 q(l, j) ≤
∑
l∈GR
r(l)2 q(l, j)
Theorems 2 and 3 show that the criterion of Equation 6 is
optimal, in a worst-case sense.
Corollary 1. The criterion proposed in Equation 6 for
choosing the most promising bid guarantees, in the worst-
case, the best possible approximation ratio.
None of the other criteria examined in Section 4 achieves
the same approximation ratio. Let us show this explicitly
for the normalized criterion of Equation 7, and characterize
exactly the approximation ratio achieved by this criterion.
Along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3, one can show
that using the normalized ranking criterion:
r(i) = p(i)/
√√√√ n∑
j=1
q(i, j) / kj
achieves a
√
Mn-approximation where M is the maximum
of the kj ’s. The following example shows that this upper
bound is exact. Therefore the normalized criterion is not
optimal.
Consider two commodities, and assume there are k units
of the first one (k1 = k) and one unit of the second one
(k2 = 1). There are two bids. The first one is 〈k, 1,
√
2〉 and
the second one is 〈1, 0, 1/
√
k〉. Both bids have the same nor-
malized ranking criterion (1). Assume the greedy method
places the second bid first. It obtains 1/
√
k instead of the
optimal
√
2: an
√
2 k-approximation, not as good as the√
k + 1-approximation provided by the unnormalized crite-
rion. In Section 2, we indicated that we were willing to
consider dynamic, and not only static, ordering criteria for
the bids. Our conclusion is that the optimal criterion is a
static one, quite a surprising conclusion.
6. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CHOOSING THE MOST PROMISING BID
As noted in Section 3 the choice of a method for bounding
the possible value of an auction from above is quite unprob-
lematic in practice: one may use a wealth of methods and
take the smallest upper-bound obtained. In practice, one
will, on the basis of the record of past runs, easily find out
which of the methods are useless and stop using them. The
choice of the most promising bid studied in Section 4 and 5
is much more of a problem. The criterion described in (6)
is shown to be theoretically optimal in Corollary 1, but is
it the best in practice? It is the criterion that guarantees
the best approximation ratio in the worst case, does it pro-
vide the best solution in practice? The truth of the matter
is that only experience with real MUCAs can tell and, at
this moment, no such data exists. We can only point out at
two considerations. First, the examples of Section 5 present
quite tellingly why the criterion defined in (6) strikes a bal-
ance between a criterion favoring large bids and a global
view such as the one defined in (1) or one that favors small
bids and fine tuning such as defined in (2) or in (4). The
proof of Theorem 3 also shows why the unnormalized crite-
rion of (6) should be preferred to the normalized criterion
of (7). Secondly, we have confidence in the applicability
of theoretical results: techniques that can be proved to be
optimal in theory tend to work well.
In [7], the authors use a complex method for choosing the
most promising bid: their choice depends on the other bids
and also on the results of the bounding-from-above proce-
dure. Since the ordering of the commodities does not depend
on the price offered by the bids, but may determine the so-
lution that will be considered first, it seems that this first
candidate solution may be arbitrarily worse than the opti-
mal solution. The basic criterion used inside bins is similar
to that of (2) and therefore not optimal in theory.
7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Experimental results are crucial in the assessment of the
ideas developed above. Three basic questions should be an-
swered.
1. Does the criterion for choosing the most promising bid
that has been shown to be optimal in Corollary 1 per-
form well in practice, i.e., does a search algorithm that
uses this criterion find rapidly the optimal solution?
2. Do the different methods for bounding from above the
value of the optimal solution lead to the pruning of
many large subtrees? Which of those methods are
most useful?
3. Are those bounding methods fast enough to be usable
in practice or does their use imply that the algorithm
spends an unbearable amount of time in computing
upper bounds? A trade-off between the amount of
effort spent in pruning and in examining new nodes
must be struck.
The best would obviously be to examine those questions on
data obtained from real-life combinatorial auctions. Such
data is very difficult to find and we could not put our hands
on such data. The next best thing that can be done is to use
auctions artificially generated. In [7], the authors define a
probability distribution over combinatorial auctions and test
the average behavior of their algorithm on this distribution.
We chose to use the same distribution, with the same values
for the parameters.
Let us address the second question first. The answer is
emphatically positive. The methods proposed above provide
upper bounds that allow for an extremely thorough pruning
of the search tree. Linear Programming provides a very
tight upper bound that leads to a very short search path
over the tree: only a very small fraction of the nodes have
to be expanded. For example, considering 40 bids, we found
that only 1.6× 10−9 of the nodes were visited.
The projections bounds are not as good, and provide, for
the distribution we used, bounds that are not better than
the bound provided by average price considerations. This is
probably due to the specific distribution chosen, in which it
is rarely the case that a single good is dominant, such as,
e.g., in the case all bids request all the units of a certain
specific good. One of the characteristics of the distribution
suggested in [7] is that bids tend to request only a small
number of units per good. This kind of distribution leads to
an auction with no dominant good for which the projection
bounds are quite loose. R. Holte [4] found that, on another
distribution, the projection bound is very good. Neverthe-
less, projection bounds allow us to visit only 1.6 × 10−8 of
the nodes.
The average price upper bound is not as good as the Lin-
ear Programming one, but is, on average, as good as the
projection bound. It allows for a very thorough pruning of
the search tree. Considering 40 bids, we found that only
1.6 × 10−8 of the nodes had to be visited. This number is
the same as the one for the projection bound and ten times
larger than the one for Linear Programming.
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Figure 1: This graph shows the part of the execution
time spent until the optimal solution is found as a
function of the number of bids for auctions of four-
teen goods. Auctions are distributed as proposed
by Leyton-Brown, Shoham and Tennenholtz. Times
are averaged over ten trials.
Let us now address the third question. We found Linear
Programming to be extremely costly (in time) to use, so
costly as to render its use infeasible for large combinatorial
auctions. Since we have only just begun experimenting, we
hope that we shall learn in the future how to use Linear
Programming effectively. The average price upper bound is,
on the contrary, computed very fast. The projection bounds
are not computed as fast. Since we explained above that the
projection bounds were, on our distribution, not better, the
results to be presented below have all been obtained by using
the average price upper bound exclusively.
Let us discuss the first question now. The best test of the
quality of our ordering heuristic is probably to examine how
fast the optimal solution is obtained. We found that, using
the ordering criterion described in Equation 6, the optimal
solution is found extremely rapidly and the algorithm spends
an overwhelming part of its time in showing that this solu-
tion is indeed optimal. In Figure 1, we plot the time spent
until the optimal solution is found divided by the total time
spent in the search for auctions of different sizes. All auc-
tions include 14 goods, the number of bids is found on the x
axis. For small auctions this number is of the order of 4%;
for larger auctions this number decreases about linearly on
a logarithmic scale and for auctions of 150 bids, the optimal
solution is found after only 0.014% of the total execution
time. It seems that this percentage decreases at least ex-
ponentially. Those results seem to improve significantly on
those of [7]. The Percentage Optimality graph there seems to
indicate than more than 10% of the time is spent before the
optimal solution is found. Those results indicate that the
criterion of Equation 6 that we proved theoretically optimal
is extremely good in practice.
Figure 2 describes the execution times of our branch and
bound algorithm using the average price upper bound and
the ordering heuristic of Equation 6: on the x-axis the num-
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Figure 2: This graph shows the execution time for
auctions containing different numbers of bids. Auc-
tions are distributed as proposed by Leyton-Brown,
Shoham and Tennenholtz. Times are averaged over
ten trials. Each of the four curves corresponds to a
different number of goods.
ber of bids, on the y-axis the execution time. Four different
curves are plotted, corresponding to a different number of
goods. Our experimental data was collected on a Pentium
III-450 running Linux, using 640K of memory. Figure 2 is
comparable to the Number of Bids vs. Time figure in [7].
Our running times are larger, by orders of magnitude, than
theirs. For this reason, we were not even capable of solving
the smallest auctions they considered. Figure 2 shows very
clearly a sub-linear (on a logarithmic scale) growth in exe-
cution time, indicating that the growth is sub-exponential.
This feature is also found, but less clearly, in [7]’s graph. We
intend to look into the reasons for the huge gap in running
times between our algorithm and CAMUS. The huge dis-
crepancy between the amount of memory they use (25 MB)
and ours (640K) is certainly part of the explanation.
Figure 3 examines the dependence of the running time on
the number of goods. The number of bids is fixed at 50, and
the number of goods is described on the x axis. CAMUS [7]
exhibits an exponential sensitivity to the number of goods
(as opposed to the number of bids). Figure 3 clearly shows
a sub-exponential growth.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
We proposed a simple branch-and-bound framework to
solve MUCAs. We succeeded in characterizing the theoreti-
cally optimal method for sorting bids. Two main directions
for research are left open:
• characterize the power of different methods for bound-
ing from above the value of MUCAs
• run more extensive experiments to compare the perfor-
mance of different heuristics both for bounding and for
ordering and to compare our proposal to others such
as in [7].
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Figure 3: This graph shows the execution time for 50
bids auctions with different numbers of goods. Auc-
tions are distributed as proposed by Leyton-Brown,
Shoham and Tennenholtz. Times are averaged over
ten trials.
• consider more efficient ways of using Linear Program-
ming, using the results of previous computations to
speed up the search for a solution.
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